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Abstract
Applied to the European markets, this paper analyzes the price of credit risk on the 
Credit Default Swap (CDS) and corporate bond markets by comparing the sensitivity 
of the credit spreads on each market to systematic, idiosyncratic risk factors and 
liquidity. Our analysis confirms the existence of a long-run relationship between the 
two markets, and the tendency for CDS markets to lead corporate bond markets in 
terms of price discovery. We find that the outbreak of the financial turmoil in the 
summer of 2007 induced a substantial increase in risk aversion and a shift in the 
pricing of credit risk, with CDS markets becoming more sensitive to systematic risk 
while cash bond markets priced in more information about liquidity and idiosyncratic 
risk. Moreover, the financial turbulence also brought about a systematic disconnection 
between the two markets caused by the significant change in the lead-lag relationship, 
with CDS markets always leading the cash bond markets. 
Keywords: Credit Default Swap Spreads, Corporate Bond Spreads, Liquidity  
JEL Classification: G12, G14, G15 5
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Non Technical Summary
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the pricing dynamics in the two credit markets.
Using weekly data, the analysis is applied to European ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms over
the period January 2004 to October 2008. Two avenues are examined in more detail. First,
we study to what extent credit spread movements are inﬂuenced by ﬁrm-speciﬁc, common
factors and liquidity. To this end we also examine if a long-term equilibrium relationship
between prices on the two markets exists. Second, we analyse potential explanations as to
why the pricing in the two markets can temporarily change over time. Particular emphasis
is put on the developments since August 2007, when there was a clear shift in the pricing of
credit risk on both the CDS and corporate bond markets. Using the methodology developed
by Berndt et al. (2004) and Amato (2005) we break down the credit spread into the ”amount
of risk” (approximated by expected default frequencies) and the ”price of risk” (including
default risk premia and liquidity risk). The paper’s four main ﬁndings are as follows. First,
in terms of relative importance, common systematic factors seem to play a relatively larger
role in explaining movements in Euro area entities’ CDS spreads compared to the inﬂuence
common factors exert on the same entities’ corporate bond spreads. Instead, corporate bond
spread ﬂuctuations appear to be more sensitive to movements in ﬁrm-speciﬁc and liquidity
factors. Second, we ﬁnd, in line with theory, that a long-run equilibrium relationship between
the spread movements in the two credit markets can be established for most entities and that
the outbreak of the ﬁnancial market turmoil in the summer months of 2007 contributed to
a weakening of the long-run co-movements between the two asset classes. Third, the results
show that CDS markets tend to lead corporate bond markets in terms of price discovery, and
that this lead-lag relationship strengthened following the sub-prime related turmoil. Fourth,
we examine credit risk pricing during the turmoil further by breaking down movements in
credit spreads into actual default rates and the corresponding default risk premia/liquidity
risk. We ﬁnd evidence that the general increases in credit spreads on both markets during the
turmoil period have been driven mainly by default risk compensation demanded by investors.
This feature is particularly pronounced for the CDS markets. The paper adds to the existing
literature in two main ways. First, it is the ﬁrst, to our knowledge, that models the joint
movements in corporate bond spreads during favourable market conditions and periods of
ﬁnancial stress. Second, our approach of linking the decomposition of default risk premia
and expected losses on credit markets with the structural modelling approach is also novel.6
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1 Introduction
From 2004 to mid-2007, the credit markets in most major economies were characterised by low
volatility and narrow credit spreads. This favourable ﬁnancial market environment came to an
abrupt end in the summer of 2007 when concerns about the health of the US real estate sector
began to mount. As a result, credit spreads surged rapidly in most economies. There are, in
principle, many factors that can trigger ﬂuctuations in credit spreads. For instance, higher credit
spreads can emanate from an expected slowdown in overall economic activity, resulting in lower
ﬁrm proﬁtability and a higher default risk. However, higher credit spreads can also occur in an envi-
ronment marked by low ﬁnancial market liquidity. During such periods, investors tend to demand
a higher premium for investment in risky credit-related instruments. In order to draw accurate
policy conclusions, it is crucial that central banks and governments identify the underlying forces
which are driving credit spread ﬂuctuations.
The standard way of evaluating changes in markets’ perceived credit outlook for ﬁrms is by moni-
toring movements in corporate bond spreads. Corporate bond spreads are usually measured as the
diﬀerence between the yields oﬀered on ﬁrms’ corporate debt instruments and the risk-free interest
rates, the latter is normally approximated by government bond yields (or swap yields). Corporate
bond spreads can be deﬁned as the risk premium corporations pay investors to compensate them
for a number of risks associated with corporate debt.1
Recent ﬁnancial innovations, in the form of credit derivatives, have provided analysts and policy
makers with further measures to gauge ﬁrms’ perceived credit risk. Credit Default Swaps (CDS)
are of particular interest as they, similarly to corporate bond spreads, capture credit risk. In a
CDS agreement the buyer of protection against default makes a periodic or upfront payment to the
seller of the default swap. The seller of protection promises to make a payment in the event of a
default on a reference obligation - which is usually a bond or a loan. The default swap premium is
often referred to as the default swap spread.
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the pricing dynamics in the two credit markets. Using
weekly data, the analysis is applied to European ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms over the period
January 2004 to October 2008. Two avenues are examined in more detail. First, we study to what
extent credit spread movements are inﬂuenced by ﬁrm-speciﬁc, common factors and liquidity. To
this end we also examine if a long-term equilibrium relationship between prices on the two markets
exists. Second, we analyse potential explanations as to why the pricing in the two markets can
temporarily change over time. Particular emphasis is put on the developments since August 2007,
when there was a clear shift in the pricing of credit risk on both the CDS and corporate bond
1These risks include default risk (when issuers are unable to make interest and principal payments on
time), liquidity risk (when unwinding a position could result in adverse price changes as some corporate debt
instruments are thinly traded) and prepayment risk (when issuers have an option that allows them to buy
back all or part of the issue prior to maturity)7
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2 Decoupling Movements between corporate Bond Spreads
and CDS Spreads during the 2007-2008 turmoil - a
case study
markets. Using the methodology developed by Berndt et al. (2004) and Amato (2005) we break
down the credit spread into the ”amount of risk” (approximated by expected default frequencies)
and the ”price of risk” (including default risk premia and liquidity risk).
The paper’s main ﬁndings are as follows. First, in terms of relative importance, common system-
atic factors seem to play a relatively larger role in explaining movements in euro area entities’
CDS spreads compared to the inﬂuence common factors exert on the same entities’ corporate bond
spreads. Instead, corporate bond spread ﬂuctuations appear to be more sensitive to movements
in ﬁrm-speciﬁc and liquidity factors. Second, we ﬁnd, in line with theory, that a long-run equi-
librium relationship between the spread movements in the two credit markets can be established
for most entities and that the outbreak of the ﬁnancial market turmoil in the summer months
of 2007 contributed to a weakening of the long-run co-movements between the two asset classes.
Third, the results show that CDS markets tend to lead corporate bond markets in terms of price
discovery, and that this lead-lag relationship strengthened following the sub-prime related turmoil.
Fourth, we examine credit risk pricing during the turmoil further by breaking down movements in
credit spreads into actual default rates and the corresponding default risk premia/liquidity risk.
We ﬁnd evidence that the general increases in credit spreads on both markets during the turmoil
period have been driven mainly by default risk compensation demanded by investors. This feature
is particularly pronounced for the CDS markets.
The paper adds to the existing literature in two main ways. First, to our knowledge, it is the
ﬁrst paper that models the joint movements in corporate bond spreads during favourable market
conditions and periods of ﬁnancial stress. Second, our approach of linking the decomposition of
default risk premia and expected losses on credit markets with insights from structured models is
also novel.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 conducts a case study on recent
price dynamics in the two markets. Section 3 discusses related literature. Section 4 outlines the
structural model employed, while sections 5 and 6 discuss the data used and the results. Section 7
concludes.
Financial market theory suggests that CDS spreads and corporate bond spreads for the same
entities are bound by no-arbitrage conditions. By ignoring diﬀerences in liquidity and assuming
the maturity of the corporate debt equals that of the CDS, an investor who acquires a corporate8
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bond and buys protection for the same reference entity in the CDS market should be hedged against
the default of this particular ﬁrm. The implied no-arbitrage assumption between the two markets
suggests that the price of buying such a protection against default in the CDS markets should equal
the observed corporate bond yield spread.
Despite the above mentioned arbitrage conditions, recent developments in ﬁnancial markets have
shown that substantial deviations between CDS spreads and corporate bond spreads can occur
over a prolonged period of time. To provide a telling example, Figure 1a below depicts 5-year CDS
senior loan spreads and aggregate corporate bond spreads over swaps (and the diﬀerence between
the two) for the Daimler entity. The sample period is January 2004 to October 2008. Figure 1b
shows the same series but focuses on the developments since September 2008.
Three notable features emerge from the two ﬁgures (which can be deemed as typical behaviour for
euro area ﬁrms over this time period). First, up until mid January 2008, the CDS spreads for the
Daimler entity moved broadly in tandem with Daimler’s corporate bond spreads. This provides
some evidence that investors viewed and priced the two asset classes broadly in line with the theory.
Second, although the diﬀerences are quite small in magnitude, CDS spreads for Daimler have on
average hovered at slightly higher levels than its corporate bond spreads between January 2004 and
January 2008 (15 basis points on average). Third, in September and October 2008, corporate bonds
spreads increased much more than comparable CDS spreads, see Figure 1b. By end-October 2008,
the CDS spreads for Daimler stood at around 330 basis points whereas corporate bond spreads had
surged to a level of 600 basis points.
Figure 1
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(a) Daimler CDS spreads and Daimler corporate bond spreads (over swaps) and the spread diﬀerence (January 2004 - October
2008, daily data)
(b) Daimler CDS spreads and Daimler corporate bond spreads (over swaps) and the spread diﬀerence (September 2008 - October
2008, daily data)9
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There are two main explanations for the, on average, slightly higher CDS spreads. First, it is
relatively easier to short credit by buying credit protection in the CDS markets (which pushes
CDS spreads higher, everything else held equal). Shorting credit in the corporate bond markets is,
however, diﬃcult as the liquidity is not optimal for these types of transactions. Second, investors
usually hold a number of various assets and use them as collateral for funding purposes. In this
sense, corporate bonds are the preferred instrument, rather than CDS contracts. This feature tends
to push corporate bond spreads down relative to CDS spreads.
The general pattern of close co-movements between the two markets were broken in the au-
tumn of 2008 when corporate bond spreads witnessed some sharp increases while the widening
of CDS spreads was far less pronounced. Market intelligence suggests that, particularly after the
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, investors’ ﬂight-to-safety portfolio shifts and a preference for hold-
ing cash over risky assets (such as corporate bonds) can explain most of the decoupling between
the two asset classes in September and October 2008. In addition, it is reasonable to assume that
lending institutes became more prudent during these months and increased their collateral require-
ment, which probably also induced some investors to reduce their corporate bond exposure.2
Clearly, the turmoil period (that began in August 2007) seems to have generated some unusual
pricing pattern in the two markets. The basis (deﬁned as the diﬀerence between CDS spreads and
corporate bond spreads) became highly volatile for many entities. Before examining the driving
forces underlying the developments in the two credit markets, the next section reviews the related
literature.
3 Related Literature
Literature on credit risk modelling has resulted in two approaches - structural and reduced-form
approaches. Structural models perceive default risk as an endogenous process, partially accounted
for by the structural factors, while the reduced form approach assumes that ﬁrms’ default is not
predictable and driven by an exogenous default intensity process, see Duﬃe and Singleton (1999)
for an overview. The reduced-form approach has been criticised on the grounds of the weak eco-
nomic rationale for the occurrence of a default event, which is why the structural model is widely
preferred by practitioners in the ﬁeld of credit risk.
Structural models build on the classic Black and Scholes (1973) option pricing model, formalised
by Merton (1974). According to the basic Merton model, a bond defaults when the ﬁrm value falls
below the debt value at the time of the maturity of the bond.
2See the Lex column ”Bond appeal” in the November 20 issue of Financial Times and the November 14,
research note ”Global Speculations, a very negative basis” by Tim Bond at Barclays Capital.10
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Our speciﬁcation builds on the economic intuition of a structural model. To this end, we test the
relevance of key variables used in structural models (asset returns, asset volatility) for explaining
the market price of credit risk. That is, we assume that default is endogenously driven by the
ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial structure. In contrast, a reduced form model assumes that default is exogenously
determined and driven by default intensity, see Arora et al. (2005).
Another important diﬀerence between structural and the reduced- form models concerns the in-
formation assumptions. The structural model assumes complete information about ﬁrm’s asset
value. This restriction is not imposed in reduced-form models. Again, our speciﬁcation includes
ﬁrm speciﬁc information of the type used in structural models (asset returns and asset volatility).
Apart from the above mentioned ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors such as asset returns and asset volatility,
expected recovery rates also aﬀect credit spreads. Given that ﬁrms’ recovery rates are closely inter-
twined with the economy’s macro conditions, this suggest that variables capturing systematic risk
are also potential explanatory factors behind changes in investors’ perceived credit risk. Athanas-
sakos and Carayannopoulos (2001) ﬁnd empirical evidence that corporate bond yield spreads and
the business cycle are closely intertwined (while controlling for variations in default risk, bond
optionalities, tax eﬀects and liquidity). For similar ﬁndings, see Altman and Kishore (1996) and
Helwege and Kleiman (1997). Structural models that include macro variables are also widely used
among practitioners. For example, Goldman Sachs models the spread of low-grade US corporate
bond yields over Treasuries as a function of both economic and ﬁnancial variables using quarterly
data over the past forty years (the so-called GS-SPREAD model).
Over the past few years, credit risk trading has been complemented by complex ﬁnancial innova-
tions. The highly liquid credit default swaps (CDS) are of particular interest as they, similarly
to corporate bond spreads, capture ﬁrms’ default risk. There is substantial literature that builds
on structural models to analyse movements in CDS spreads. Benkert (2004) shows that option
implied volatility has the highest relevance for explaining CDS premia, among all other volatility
measures. Zhang et al. (2006) set up a model of CDS spreads that includes the equity volatility
and the jump risk of individual ﬁrms. Their results suggest that the volatility risk and the jump
risk alone signiﬁcantly improve the predictability of CDS spreads. Ericsson et al. (2004) show that
the risk-free rate and ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors such as ﬁnancial leverage and volatility all exert a signif-
icant impact on the level and changes of US ﬁrms’ CDS spreads. Controlling for the expected loss
and other ﬁrm-speciﬁc and market level variables, Raunig and Scheicher (2008) compares the risk
premia embedded in CDS spreads for banks and corporations. They ﬁnd that banks were perceived
as less risky than corporations before the sub-prime related turmoil began in the summer of 2007.
During the turmoil period, the two groups are priced broadly similar.
The empirical results from the CDS literature imply that CDS spreads are to be preferred over
corporate bond spreads when measuring ﬁrm-speciﬁc credit risk. There are two main arguments
for this assessment. First, although corporate bond spreads and CDS contracts share similar de-11
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terminants, the CDS contracts are quoted directly in terms of spreads. Corporate bond spreads,
on the other hand, have to be imputed from the yields on government bonds or swaps, which can
potentially lead to measurement bias. Second, the CDS markets are very liquid and probably even
more so in times of ﬁnancial market stress, which favours the hypothesis that the price discovery
takes place in the CDS markets. Moreover, bond prices are aﬀected by interest rate risk and taxa-
tion issues, suggesting that CDS spreads might be a better measure of default risk.
This paper extends the existing literature on structural credit risk modelling by examining to what
extent credit and CDS spreads are driven by the same factors and also analyses the impact ﬁnancial
market stress has on the implied parity relationship between the two markets. Our approach is
similar to Blanco et al. (2005), who ﬁnd a parity relation between the US corporate bond and
CDS markets. By using a rather short sample (1.5 years) of daily data, they conclude that the
price discovery is quicker in the CDS markets and that macro variables have a larger immediate
impact on cash bond spreads than on CDS prices. A long term relationship between the two credit
markets for European entities was also documented by Norden and Weber (2004), Zhu (2006) and
De Wit (2006). Overall, most previous studies found the existence of a long-term (cointegrating)
relationship between the two markets for the bulk of the entities examined.
The existence of a long-run relationship between the two markets does not, however, exclude short-
run arbitrage opportunities. Levin et al. (2005) argue that market frictions are the main cause
of non-zero CDS-bond spread basis. The authors argue that these market frictions are caused by
systematic and idiosyncratic factors. Forte and Pena (2006) show that, in terms of price discovery,
stock markets lead both bond and CDS markets. Concentrating on the CDS and bond markets,
Doetz (2007) studies the price discovery in these two markets in a time-variant context. The results
indicate that although the CDS market slightly dominates the price discovery process, its contribu-
tion fell signiﬁcantly during the 2005 turbulence when General Motors and Ford were downgraded
by the rating agencies from investment grade to ”junk” grade.
The ﬁnancial market crisis that began in the summer of 2007 challenges the explanatory power of
the structural model approach. A simple linear model can hardly account for the jumps in corpo-
rate bond spreads and CDS spreads observed in 2008. In an attempt to answer what actually drives
credit spread movements during diﬃcult market conditions, we make use of the insights provided
by Berndt et al. (2004) and Amato (2005). They show that the CDS can be broken down into two
components; one that compensates investors for the expected loss and a second that compensates
investors’ aversion to default risk. Using data between 2002 and 2005, Amato (2005) stresses that
default risk premia broadly follow the same pattern as perceived default risk but the movements
tend to be more volatile.12
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4 The Model
Building on the previous literature on structural credit risk models, we assume in our modelling
framework, that investors make use of a broad range of information and factors when they price
credit risk. This information includes ﬁrm-speciﬁc, common and liquidity related factors. Below
we discuss these three segments in some detail.
The relevance of ﬁrm speciﬁc factors for the pricing of credit risk is a direct implication of Merton’s
structural debt valuation model. In this framework, corporate liabilities are seen as contingent
claims on the assets of a ﬁrm. Default is triggered whenever asset value falls below debt value (the
analogue of the strike price in option pricing). Credit risk is measured by the probability that,
at maturity, the asset value of a ﬁrm falls below the face value of this debt. The position of the
bondholder is similar to that of the writer of a put option on the assets of the ﬁrm with a strike
price equal to the face value of the debt. One intuitive interpretation of this approach is that the
bondholder writes a put option to the equity holders at contract initiation. When default occurs,
the equity holder will exercise his put option and sell the ﬁrm to the bondholder in exchange for
the debt price. Thus, the default probability is a function of the ﬁnancial structure of the ﬁrm, i.e.
leverage, the volatility of the rate of return of the assets, time to maturity and the risk-free rate.
In line with Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) and Blanco et al. (2005), we use i) equity return and ii)
ﬁrst diﬀerences in implied equity volatility as the ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors relevant for the size of the
default premium.
(i) Equity return. To capture each ﬁrm’s individual ﬁnancial health we employ equity returns.
Everything else held equal, a drop in stock prices increases leverage and generates uncertainty
about a ﬁrm’s debt repayment capacity. This should be reﬂected in a higher default probability
and higher CDS and credit spreads. Thus, a negative sign is expected for equity returns.
(ii) Implied equity volatility. The basic economic reasoning for using changes in the implied volatility
relies on the ”leverage eﬀect”: equity return and volatility are negatively correlated because a
decrease in the value of equity increases ﬁnancial leverage, which in turn tends to make equity more
volatile. Higher expected equity volatility signals deteriorating repayment capacity and therefore
a higher default probability. A positive sign is thus expected for equity volatility.
Individual ﬁrms’ credit risk is also inﬂuenced by common (or systematic) factors. Clearly, the
probability of default is higher in a recessionary environment. The common factors considered in
our analysis include (i) ten-year government bonds yields (depending on the issuer’s country of
origin), (ii) market equity return and (iii) market implied equity volatility.
(i) Government bond yields. Long-term government bond yields can be viewed as a reasonable
proxy for the overall macroeconomic outlook. The expected sign is, however, not clear and must
be determined empirically. A negative sign can be derived from the Fisher hypothesis which states
t h a tt h ey i e l d so ﬀ e r e do nag o v e r n m e n tb o n dc a nb eb r o k e nd o w ni n t oar e a lr a t ec o m p o n e n t13
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and a component which investors demand for the expected inﬂation to prevail over the maturity
of the bonds (investors usually also require a term-premia whose size tends to be related to the
expected uncertainty prevailing around future inﬂation expectations). The real rate component is
positively related to the economic growth prospects. Thus, higher bond yields may signal optimistic
expectations about future economic activity which should lower the perceived default risk for ﬁrms,
leading to lower credit spreads (i.e. a negative sign).
A positive sign can be derived from the ﬁnancing cost argument. An increase in government
bond yields pushes up the cost of ﬁnance for the ﬁrms. Higher cost of ﬁnance means that fewer
investment prospects will show a positive net present value and hence, lower aggregate investments
in the economy. Lower investments could trigger an overall slowdown in economic growth, resulting
in higher defaults and higher spreads. This argument would support a positive sign for government
bond yields.
(ii) Market equity returns. Stock prices in an economy are determined by ﬁrms’ current and
expected dividends, discounted by the risk-free rate and the equity risk premium investors demand.
Dividends are usually paid out as a fraction of ﬁrms’ earnings. Firms’ earnings prospects are,
in turn, crucially determined by the overall economic growth prospects. Thus, movements in
broad-based stock price indices can provide useful information for assessing market participants’
expectations about economic activity in the economy as a whole. A negative sign is expected for
market equity returns.
(iii) Market implied volatility. Option-implied volatility derived from broad-based stock market
indices is a standard measure of overall macroeconomic uncertainty. Movements in stock market
volatility tend to be a relatively good early indicator of recessions. For instance, in both the US
and the Euro area, stock market volatility surged prior to or during all recessions that occurred
since 1973, see Andersson and Hofmann (2008). A positive sign is expected for market implied
volatility.
Apart from the ﬁrm speciﬁc, common factors we also include a proxy factor to for the time-
varying global liquidity risk. In line with Levin et al. (2005), we use the diﬀerence between US
on-the-run and oﬀ-the-run government bond yields. This is calculated as the diﬀerence between
the yield oﬀered on the most recently issued (”on-the-run”) US nominal government bond and
”the yield obtained when pricing identical cash ﬂows using a yield curve estimated using all other
bonds and notes (”oﬀ-the-run”)”, see ECBa (2008). This diﬀerence is usually small (ﬁve to ten
basis points) during tranquil periods in ﬁnancial markets. On the other hand, during periods when
ﬁnancial market liquidity dries up, investors tend to seek protection in the most liquid ”on-the-
run” government bonds resulting in a widening between ”oﬀ-the-run” and ”on-the-run” bonds. A
positive sign is expected for the ”oﬀ-the-run” and ”on-the-run” yield diﬀerence.14
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5 Data Description
We use mid-CDS spreads provided by Datastream for 29 large European ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial
ﬁrms (15 for the non-ﬁnancial sector and 14 for the ﬁnancial sector) included in the iTraxx index.
The sample runs from 1 January 2004 to 31 October 2008. We limit the study to the 5-year matu-
rity CDS, which is the most traded maturity segment. CDS are traded in notional amounts of 10
Million. This means if an entity is traded with 50 basis points, the total cost of annually obtaining
insurance for this company is EUR 50,000.
Table 2 in the Appendix shows summary statistics for the CDS and corporate bond spread data
as well as the explanatory factors. Three notable features can be inferred from the Table. First,
the ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors (implied volatility and stock market returns) share similar characteristics
across the two samples. Second, the large deviations between the minimum and maximum values
suggest strong heterogeneity within the samples. Third, the mean diﬀerences between CDS spreads
and credit spreads (i.e. the basis) are more marked for the ﬁnancial ﬁrms when compared with the
non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms. To illustrate this, Table 3 provides a detailed description of the basis develop-
ments for all entities. The average basis for the bulk of the ﬁrms is less than 10 basis points but
there are, at the same time, a number of ﬁrms for which relatively large diﬀerences can be observed.
This reﬂects diﬀerences related to both fundamental and technical factors but also the diﬃculties
to extract ”clean” comparable measures of corporate debt data. Given the strong basis decoupling
in October 2008 (as mentioned in the case study Section) the Table also shows the basis statistics
for this particular month. As can be seen, in October the average basis became substantially more
negative for both ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms.
Finding corporate bond data that matches the CDS data in terms of maturity and characteristics
is not an easy task. In order to be as consistent as possible we take the following approach when
extracting the corporate bonds. As a ﬁrst screening we search for bonds expiring between 2006
and 2014. After ﬁltering, the median corporate bond spread is calculated on a weekly basis. For
a number of banks and ﬁrms, a second screening process was required. Such a process was needed
for some ﬁrms with a very limited number of outstanding bonds trading in 2004 and 2005. For
these cases we choose the bonds which most closely mimic the dynamics of the same entity’s CDS
spreads. As a reference, we choose to compute the spreads over 5-year swap spreads. The alter-
native would be to calculate the spread over government bonds, but as discussed in Blanco et al.
(2005), government bonds are not an ideal proxy for the unobservable risk-free rate. Taxation,
special agreements with repos and benchmark status can vary over time, thereby distorting this
measure.
Corporate bond spreads over the swap curve are extracted from Datastream using datatype ”SWSP”.
We use of Datastream to obtain ﬁrm speciﬁc at-the-money implied volatility (datatype ”O1”) and
stock price information for each entity in our sample. For the common factors, we use ten-year15
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government bond yields extracted from Datatstream. We use Datastream to extract implied volatil-
ity from options on the Dow Jones Eurostoxx 50 (datatype ”VSTOXXI”), FTSE 100 (datatype
”VFTSEIX”) and the SMI index (datatype ”VSMIIDX”). Market stock returns are also calcu-
lated from Datastream: for the Euro area (mnemonic ”TOTMKEM”), for Switzerland (mnemonic
”TOTMKSW”) and for the United Kingdom (mnemonic ”TOTMKUK”). The spread between the
on-the-run and the oﬀ-the-run bonds was obtained from the website of the Federal Reserve Bank
of Cleveland.3
6R e s u l t s
The following regressions are estimated:
ΔCDSit(ΔCSit)=α + β1FIVit + β2FSRit + β3BONDt + β4IVt +
β5SRt + β6TRt + β7ECi(t−1) +  it (1)
Where CDSit represents credit default swaps for ﬁrm i at time t, CSit credit spreads, FIVit ﬁrm-
speciﬁc implied volatility, FSRit ﬁrm-speciﬁc weekly stock returns, BONDt the yields oﬀered on
ten-year benchmark bonds, IVt implied volatility, SRt weekly stock returns, OTRt the diﬀerence
b e t w e e no n - t h e - r u na n do ﬀ - t h e - r u ny i e l d so nU Sg o v e r n m e n tb o n d sa n dECit represents the lagged
errors from a (level) regression of CDS spreads on corporate bond spreads (see equation 2 below).
Table 1 shows the estimation results for the ﬁnancial and the non ﬁnancial sample (for both CDS
and credit spreads).
Columns (1), (2), (5) and (6) refer to individual regressions. Similar to the method used by Blanco
et al. (2005), the p values are obtained from the cross-sectional regression of the coeﬃcient esti-
mates on a constant. Although this way of estimating the unit level regression method says little
about the statistical properties of the individual regressions, it gives an indication on whether the
homogeneity restriction imposed by the panel estimation is appropriate. Given that the bulk of the
parameter estimates are signiﬁcant the homogeneity assumption seems appropriate. Thus, columns
(3), (4), (7) and (8) replicate the speciﬁcations from the individual regressions in a ﬁxed eﬀects
panel framework.
In the benchmark setup (columns (1), (3), (5) and (7)) the CDS and corporate bond spreads are
regressed on the above mentioned ﬁrm-speciﬁc and common factors. In the extended speciﬁcation
(columns (2), (4), (6) and (8)) the long-term relationship between the two markets is taken into
account, where the EC coeﬃcients represent the sensitivity to the lagged errors from a (level) re-
gression of CDS spreads on corporate bond spreads:
3See: hrefhttp://www.clevelandfed.org/research/data/tips/
CDSit = α + βCSit +  it (2)16
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6.1 Benchmark Speciﬁcation
We consider the panel framework to be more informative and therefore discuss the outcome of these
estimations in the current and next sub-sections. The results of the panel benchmark speciﬁcation
are shown in columns (3) and (7) in Table 1. Three main features are to be noted in terms of signif-
icance of the explanatory variables. First, common factor variables matter more for CDS spreads
than for credit spreads, while ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables seem to be more relevant for the pricing of
credit risk in the corporate bond markets.
Second, the coeﬃcients for long-term government bonds are in general signiﬁcant. The negative
sign suggests that ﬁnancial markets perceive higher government bond yields to signal improved
economic growth prospects and lower perceived default risk on the side of the ﬁrms.
Third, global liquidity pressure (measured as the diﬀerence between the yields on US on-the-run
and oﬀ-the-run government bonds) tends to signiﬁcantly widen corporate bond spreads. Intuitively,
during periods of ﬁnancial stress and liquidity constrains, ﬂight-to-quality portfolio shifts from risky
credit assets such as corporate bonds to safer assets tend to drive corporate bond spreads higher.
Interestingly, however, our liquidity proxy has a tightening eﬀect on CDS spreads across all model
speciﬁcations. Interpreting these results in term of the liquidity spill-over from the cash to the
derivatives market is not straightforward. It is, however, reasonable to assume that during periods
of ﬁnancial stress short-selling in the cash bond markets becomes diﬃcult (due to liquidity con-
straints). As a result, investors seeking credit exposure under these circumstances will shy away
from the cash market and to a larger extent sell credit protection in the CDS market.
The results are in line with Buehler and Trapp (2008) who ﬁnd that liquidity risk explains large part
in the pricing of bond spreads, as opposed to CDS spreads, where credit risk receives the largest
weight. Thus, consistent with our results, the authors also ﬁnd that bond and CDS liquidity premia
are negatively correlated.
Any comparison of the liquidity on the CDS and bond market has to consider the structural dif-
ferences between the two markets. The negative coeﬃcient of the liquidity proxy in the CDS
estimations may be caused by some special features in the CDS market that gained particular
importance during the ﬁnancial turmoil. For instance, most of the sellers of CDS protection are
banks. During the turmoil, and following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in particular, the per-
ceived counterparty risk for many European banks sharply increased while liquidity dried up across
most asset classes. It is plausible to assume that the demand for protection decreased, and, as a
result of the excess-supply, many banks had to sell protection in the CDS markets at a discount.17
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To see the relative importance of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc, common factors and liquidity factors for ex-
plaining movements in the two markets, Figures 2a and 2b decompose the respective share of the
three blocks that contribute to the explanatory power (R-square). Again, common factors explain
the largest share in the variation of ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms CDS spreads. In contrast, the
three blocks have a rather similar impact on corporate bond spreads movements.
Figure 2
Determinants of CDS and corporate Bond Spreads





















Overall, CDS markets seem to be more inﬂuenced by systemic risk whereas the corporate bonds
spreads are more aﬀected by ﬁrm-speciﬁc, idiosyncratic default risk. These diﬀerences might impact
the price discovery in the two markets. For instance, a sudden change in the broad macroeconomic
environment (with ﬁrm’s speciﬁc factors resilient to such changes) could potentially trigger some
short or medium-term decoupling between the same entity’s CDS spreads and corporate bond
spreads. By examining the long-run relationship and the price discovery between the two markets
a better understanding of this decoupling can be achieved. This approach is adopted in the next
section.18
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6.2 Extended Speciﬁcation
To gain some insight about the long-term relationship and price discovery in the two markets
we extend the benchmark speciﬁcations by an error correction term (EC). We rely on the Engle-
Granger two step approach. To this end, we start by checking the integration order of all entities’
CDS and corporate bond spreads. The results of the ADF unit root test conﬁrm that all entities
CDS and corporate bond spreads are integrated of order one.4 After establishing that the entities
are integrated by the same order, we test if the residuals from a regression of CDS spreads on
a constant and corporate bond spreads (see again equation (2)) are stationary (using ADF and
Phillips-Perron tests). Table 4 in the Appendix reports the results. As indicated in the second
column of the Table, the ADF tests reveal that for 8 out of 14 ﬁnancial ﬁrms and for 10 out of 15
non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms, the null hypothesis of non-stationarity of the residuals can be rejected (at the
10 percent level). Similar results are found when applying the Phillips-Perron test (see column 3).
This is evidence for the existence of a co-integration relationship between the two markets. As a
second step, the lagged residuals from the level equations are added to the benchmark speciﬁcation.
The results of the panel framework are shown in columns (4) and (8) in Table 1.
As discussed by Blanco et al. (2005), price discovery can be derived from the sign and signiﬁcance of
”the speed of adjustment coeﬃcients” (the EC coeﬃcients in Table 1). To ensure that any deviation
from the long-term trend is corrected, a positive sign is expected for the CDS EC coeﬃcients
(column (4)) whereas a negative sign is expected for the corporate bond spread regressions (column
(8)). A negative and statistically signiﬁcant EC term in the CDS regression (column (4)) would
signal that the corporate bond market is contributing to a large extent to the price of credit risk
on the CDS market. Similarly, a positive and statistically signiﬁcant EC coeﬃcient for the CS
regression (column (8)) would imply that that the CDS markets have a marked impact on the price
discovery in the corporate bond markets.
Columns (4) and (8) show the EC coeﬃcient is negative and statistically signiﬁcant for the panel
corporate bond spread regressions (for both ﬁnancial and non ﬁnancial ﬁrms), whereas the EC
coeﬃcients are not signiﬁcant for the same panel CDS spread regressions. This indicates that the
CDS markets contribute to price discovery on the bond market while the opposite is not the case.
The same result follows from the sign and magnitude of the ”Gonzalo and Granger measure” (GG),
which is based on the manipulation of the relative magnitude of the two long-run coeﬃcients:
GG = ECCS/(ECCS − ECCDS), where ECCDS and ECCS are the long-run coeﬃcients from the
CDS and the credit spreads equation respectively. If GG ≥ 0.5, the CDS markets tend to lead the
corporate bond market because of quicker credit spread adjustments to the level of CDS spreads
compared to the way CDS spreads adjust to credit spread movements. GG ≥ 1(GG ≤ 0) could be
4One exception is the corporate bond spreads for Credit Agricole where the null-hypothesis of nonsta-
tionarity is rejected20
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interpreted as price discovery taking place only in the CDS market (corporate bond markets). As
seen in Column (4) the EC coeﬃcient for the CDS regressions are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero. This implies GG measures of 1 for both ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms, providing evidence
that the CDS derivatives market leads the cash market in terms of price discovery.
6.3 Robustness Checks
The two step estimation approach outlined in the previous section is intuitive, relatively simple,
while at the same time enabling a robust estimation. Furthermore, it enables a direct comparison
with previous papers within this strand of the literature, for instance Blanco et al. (2005). An
alternative estimation method would be to run the estimation in one step, see Davidson and G.
(2004). One aspect which favours the one step approach is the fact that it potentially suﬀers less
from serial correlation bias than the two step approach.
Thus, as a robustness test we ﬁrst check the serial correlation of the errors for all the individual
ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms. The results of the serial correlation tests are shown in Table 5
in the Appendix. The tests included up to 3 lags of the residuals. However, serial correlation test
shows that the null hypothesis of no serial correlation fails to be rejected for the bulk of the units.
To avoid serial correlation bias, the estimations shown in Section 6.1 and Section 6.2 include 3 lags
of the dependent variable.
Second, as a cross-check, we re-estimate the error correction model using the one step approach
and compare the error correction coeﬃcients for the two approaches. As can bee seen in Table 6
in the Appendix, the magnitude and statistical signiﬁcance of the error correction coeﬃcients are
broadly similar for the two approaches.
There seems to be no consensus in the literature as to which test is to be preferred. Concerning the
robustness of the tests, a major caveat of both co-integration tests discussed here is that the results
depend on the particular choice of the co-integration relation. That is, although the distribution of
the t statistic is independent of the particular choice of the co-integrating variables, its value is not.
Thus, the same test performed on the same data but diﬀerent choices of the co-integrating variables
can lead to diﬀerent results. This problem is not overcome by the ECM test. As Davidson and
G. (2004) show, as the number of possible co-integrating relationships increases, the probability
density function of the t statistic moves steadily to the left, i.e. the critical values increase and the
power of the test decreases.
However, the loss of power due to an increasing number of potential co-integration relationships is
not an issue here, because we only postulate one possible co-integrating relationship. The restriction
is justiﬁed, since the assumed long-run relationship is economically plausible and unchallenged in
t h er e l a t e dl i t e r a t u r e .E v e ni st h er e s u l t so ft h ec o - i n t e g r a t i n gt e s t sm i g h td i v e r g et os o m ee x t e n t21
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in the literature, there is consensus over the speciﬁcation of the co-integration relationship.
6.4 Credit risk pricing during the ﬁnancial market turmoil period
A natural question that arises is to what extent the ﬁnancial market turmoil that got underway
in August 2007 inﬂuences the above-reported results in sections 6.1 and 6.2. This last sub-section
examines this issue from three diﬀerent angles. First, the extended speciﬁcation is re-estimated and
evaluated using the sample up to end-July 2007. Second, we analyze the time-varying explanatory
power of ﬁrm-speciﬁc and common factors. Third, we decompose the CDS spread movements into
an expected loss and a risk premium component. The latter approach can help in explaining if
the sharp re-pricing of credit risk during turmoil period emanated from upward revision in actual
default rates or if the higher credit spreads merely reﬂect changes in investors’ risk preferences.
i) Impact of the ﬁnancial market turmoil on price discovery
The results of the estimation using only the sample up to end-July 2007 are reported in Table 7
in the Appendix (the global liquidity variable is dropped from this estimation since we consider
it to have little inﬂuence on CDS and corporate bond spreads during the overall tranquil period
2004 to mid-2007). The results show a diﬀerent pattern compared with the results obtained when
running the estimations over the entire sample. Most importantly, the results provide little support
of a systematic disconnection between the CDS and the credit market before the outbreak of the
ﬁnancial turmoil; the error correction terms are signiﬁcant with the expected sign for both ﬁnancial
and non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms. This suggests that in the period January 2004 to end-July 2007, the
prices in the two credit markets corrected deviations from their long-run relationship in a roughly
e q u i v a l e n tm a n n e r . T h i sd i ﬀ e r sf r o mt h ew h o l es a m p l ea n a l y s i sw h e r et h eC D Sm a r k e t sa l w a y s
lead the price discovery process.
In the same vein, the derived GG measures show some marked diﬀerences in the price discovery
process in the period up until end-July 2007 compared with price discovery found for the whole
sample. More speciﬁcally, the GG ratio drops from 1 to 0.83 for the ﬁnancial ﬁrms and from 1 to
0.66 for the non-ﬁnancial corporations when computing the ratios over the period January 2004
to end-July 2007. Thus, it seems that the leading role of the CDS market in the price discovery
process strengthened relative to the corporate bond markets during the ﬁnancial crisis period. This
observation is in line with Upper and Werner (2007) who examined price discovery in the German
bond futures and cash markets in the aftermath of the ﬁnancial market turbulence in 1998. They
found the derivative market to remain relatively more liquid and that contribution of the cash
market to price discovery dropped considerably.
ii) Time-varying impact of ﬁrm-speciﬁc and common factors
To evaluate if ﬁrm-speciﬁc and common factors’ respective impacts on credit risk changed over22
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the sample under consideration, we run a rolling one-year panel regression for both CDS and
credit spreads. Figures 4a to 4d in the Appendix display the respective factors contribution to the
explanatory power. Two features can be inferred from the ﬁgures. First, up until the outbreak of
the turmoil in the summer of 2007, ﬁrm-speciﬁc and common factors contributed broadly equally
(and rather marginally) to the explanatory power of CDS and corporate bond spread movements
(across ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms). Second, the ﬁnancial market turmoil seems to have
brought about a closer correlation between ﬁrm-speciﬁc and common factors on the one hand, and
ﬁrms’ CDS and corporate bond spreads on the other. In the CDS markets the increasing relevance
of systematic risk factors is particularly pronounced.
iii) Decomposing credit risk into expected losses and default risk premia
To further examine the pricing of credit risk changed after the turmoil, we decompose the observed
credit spreads into the expected losses and the risk premium that market participants demand
to invest in credit derivatives. Following the approach suggested by Berndt et al. (2004) and
Amato (2005) we proxy the markets’ perceived default risk by one-year-ahead expected default
frequencies (EDF) provided by Moody’s. By assuming a 40% recovery value (a standard assumption
i nl i t e r a t u r e )w ed e r i v et h er i s kp r e m i u ma st h ea b s o l u t ed i ﬀ e r e n c eb e t w e e nt h eo b s e r v e dl e v e lo f
CDS spreads and the expected loss. Figures 3a and 3b below show this decomposition for the
ﬁnancial and the non ﬁnancial sample.
Figure 3
Risk Premia Decomposition
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Two main features may be inferred from these decompositions. First, up until the turmoil got
underway in the summer of 2007, both expected losses and the demanded risk premium hovered
at relatively low levels (for both ﬁnancial and non ﬁnancial CDS spreads). Second, the bulk of
the sharp upturn in perceived credit risk since August 2007 seems to reﬂect a higher compensation23
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required by investors for accepting exposure to default risk rather than an actual increase in per-
ceived default risk. This conclusion is in line with a similar exercise applied on euro area Large and
Complex Banking Groups (LGCB): ”Whereas largest proportion of CDS spreads corresponded to
the compensation for expected loss between 2005 and mid-2007, since the eruption of the turmoil,
the expected-loss component has increased only moderate in comparison with the default risk pre-
mium”, see ECBb (2008).
The time-varying results described above suggested an increasing relevance of systematic risk dur-
ing the turmoil period for CDS spreads. Combining this observation with that shown in Figures
3a and 3b suggest that the sharp upturn in the default risk premia are primarily driven by higher
systematic risk. This is also supported by the large increase in the cross-sectional correlation
of residuals after August 2007 in the CDS regressions, pointing to an increasing relevance of an
unobserved common factor in this market.5.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper is aimed at comparing the price of credit risk in the CDS and the corporate bond
markets. For this purpose a structural credit risk model was estimated. Applied to the European
markets, we ﬁnd CDS spreads to be more sensitive to changes in systematic risk compared with the
corporate bond spreads. Instead, the corporate bond markets seem to price in more information
related to the ﬁrm-speciﬁc environment and the overall liquidity situation.
Given the no-arbitrage condition between the two markets, we tested for a long-run relationship
based on an error-correction setup. We ﬁnd evidence of a co-integration relationship between CDS
spreads and corporate bond spreads, conﬁrming the theoretical claim that arbitrage opportuni-
ties are traded away over the long term. Various measures for price discovery suggest that the
European CDS markets absorb information faster than corporate bond markets, probably due to
micro-structure diﬀerences between the two markets.
We ﬁnd that the period of ﬁnancial market turmoil induced a signiﬁcant shift in the way market
participants priced credit risk of which the following three are particularly notable. First, the lead-
ing role of the CDS market in the price discovery process strengthened following the ﬁnancial crisis.
Second, the ﬁnancial market turmoil seems to have brought about a closer correlation between ﬁrm-
speciﬁc and common factors on the one hand, and ﬁrms’ CDS and corporate bond spreads on the
other. Of note is that in the CDS markets the large increase in sensitivity to systematic factors is
particularly pronounced. Third, to the extent that EDF does not underestimate the true expected
5The cross-sectional correlation of residuals increased signiﬁcantly for the CDS and credit spreads regres-
sions after July 2007 (for the extended speciﬁcation) The importance of the unobserved common factor has
also been emphasised by Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001)24
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loss, the bulk of the upturn in credit risk measures during the turmoil period seems to emanate
from the higher premia investors demand for systematic risk rather than an actual increase in ﬁrms’
expected losses.25
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1085
August 2009
References
E.I Altman and V.M. Kishore. Almost everything you wanted to know about Recoveries on de-
faulted Bonds. Financial Analysts Journal, pages 57–64, 1996.
J. Amato. Risk Aversion and Risk Premia in the CDS Market. BIS Quarterly Review, pages 55–68,
2005.
M. Andersson and B. Hofmann. Asset Price Volatility- an Assessment from a Central Bank Per-
spective. Mimeo, 2008.
N. Arora, J.R. Bohn, and F. Zhu. Reduced Form vs. Structural Models of Credit Risk: A Case
Study of three Models. Journal of Investment Management, 3(4):43, 2005.
G. Athanassakos and P. Carayannopoulos. An empirical Analysis of the Relationship of Bond Yield
Spreads and Macro economic Factors. Applied Financial Economics, 11(2):197–207, 2001.
C. Benkert. Explaining Credit Default Swap Premia. Journal of Futures Markets, 24(1):71–92,
2004.
A. Berndt, R. Douglas, D. Duﬃe, M. Ferguson, and Schranz. Measuring Default Risk Premia from
Default Swap Rates and EDFs. BIS Working Paper, No 174, 2004.
F. Black and M. Scholes. The Pricing of Options and corporate Liabilities. Journal of Political
Economy, 81(3):637, 1973.
R. Blanco, S. Brennan, and W. Ian. An empirical Analysis of the dynamic Relationship between
investment-grade Bonds and Credit Default Swaps. Journal of Finance, 60(5):2255–81, 2005.
W. Buehler and M. Trapp. Time-varying Credit Risk and Liquidity Premia in Bond and CDS
Markets. 2008.
P. Collin-Dufresne, R.S. Goldstein, and J.S. Martin. The Determinants of Credit Spread Changes.
Journal of Finance, pages 2177–2207, 2001.
R. Davidson and MacKinnon J. G. Econometric Theory and Methods. Oxford University Press,
2004.
J. De Wit. Exploring the cds-bond basis. Research series, National Bank of Belgium, 2006.
N. Doetz. Time-varying Contributions by the Corporate Bond and CDS Markets to Credit Risk
Price Discovery. Discussion Paper Series 2: Banking and Financial Studies No 08/2007, 2007.26
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1085
August 2009
D. Duﬃe and K.J. Singleton. Modeling Term Structures of defaultable Bonds. Review of Financial
Studies, 12(4):687–720, 1999.
ECBa. Recent Developments in Bond Market Liquidity Premia and Implications for break-even
Inﬂation Rates. Monthly Bulletin, April Issue, Box 1, pages 25–27, 2008.
ECBb. Price of Default Risk as a Measure of Aversion to Credit Risk. Financial Stability Review,
December Issue, Box 11, pages 25–27, 2008.
J. Ericsson, J. Reneby, and H. Wang. Can Structural Models Price Default Risk? New Evidence
from Bond and Credit Derivative Markets. Working Paper, McGill University, 2004.
S. Forte and JI Pena. Credit spreads: Theory and Evidence about the Information Content of
Stocks, Bonds and CDS. SSRN Working Paper, 2006.
J. Helwege and P. Kleiman. Understanding High-Yield Bond Default Rates. The Journal of Fixed
Income, 5:79–88, 1997.
A. Levin, R. Perli, and E. Zakrajsek. The Determinants of Market Frictions in the Corporate
Market. Computing in Economics and Finance, 2005.
R.C. Merton. On the pricing of corporate debt: The risk structure of interest rates. Journal of
ﬁnance, pages 449–470, 1974.
L. Norden and M. Weber. The Co-movement of Credit Default Swap, Bond and Stock Markets:
an empirical Analysis. European ﬁnancial management, 15(3):529–562, 2004.
B. Raunig and M. Scheicher. Are Banks Diﬀerent? Evidence from the CDS Market. Discussion
Paper European Central Bank and Oesterreichische Nationalbank, 2008.
C. Upper and T. Werner. The Tail wags the Dog: time-varying Information Shares in the Bund
market. BIS Working Paper no. 224, 2007.
B.Y. Zhang, H. Zhou, and H. Zhu. Explaining Credit Default Swap Spreads with the Equity
Volatility and Jump Risks of individual Firms. Review of Financial Studies, 2006.
H. Zhu. An empirical Comparison of Credit Spreads between the Bond Market and the Credit
Default Swap Market. Journal of Financial Services Research, 29(3):211–235, 2006.27
ECB






Variable Unit Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
CDS Spreads bp 29.467 35.011 3.700 273.539
Credit Spreads bp 52.163 48.793 0.200 335.200
Implied Volatility % 29.078 19.200 8.870 217.300
Return % -0.116 1.910 -26.300 13.400
Market Implied Volatility % 19.232 9.462 9.239 87.510
Market Return % -0.049 2.150 -14.004 4.713
Treasury Yield bp 3.904 0.719 1.793 5.512
Liquidity bp 11.445 6.400 3.770 47.930
Non Financial Firms
CDS Spreads bp 43.2 36.5 5.5 591.0
Credit Spreads bp 36.6 34.5 -14.2 335.0
Implied Volatility % 26.5 11.5 7.0 140.7
Return % 0.0 3.7 -31.3 26.628
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Financial Firms Jan.2004-Oct.2008 Oct.2008
Average Absolute Average Absolute
average average
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA -22 32 -95 95
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA -26 42 -18 29
Banco Santander SA -4 15 -45 45
Barclays Bank PLC -6 20 -36 36
BNP Paribas -20 24 -68 68
Commerzbank AG 8.66 16 -140 140
Credit Agricole SA -66 106 -37 37
Credit Suisse Group AG -24 32 -53 53
Deutsche Bank AG -3 13 -49 49
Intesa Sanpaolo SpA -9.3 17 -67 67
Societe Generale -117 126 -58 58
Royal Bank of Scotland PLC/The -4 21 -78 92
UBS AG -37 43 -42 75
UniCredit SpA -10 16 -55 55
Average Financials -24 37 -60 64
Non-Financial Firms
Gaz de France 79 16 20
France Telecom 20 22 -49 42
Deutsche Telecom AG 14 19 -72 68
Bayer AG 1.36 7 -47 48
Iberdrola SA -11 35 73 73
Carrefour SA 12 14 -34 42
Daimler Chrysler 36 37 -20 31
Fortum Oyj -1 9 -18 18
Koninklijke Aeronautic Defense -16 16 -176 176
Deutsche Post Fin 71 0 -14 20
European Aeronautic Defense 10 12 43 53
Lafarge SA -8 25 117 129
Akzo Nobel NV 15 18 11 35
Lufthansa AG 12 23 -11 31
Henkel AG 21 0 -6 15
Average Non-Financials 71 8 -13 5329
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Financial Firms E-G Tests
ADF PP
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA --
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA --
Banco Santander SA *-
Barclays Bank PLC *** ***
BNP Paribas ** *
Commerzbank AG --
Credit Agricole SA -* *
Credit Suisse Group AG --
Deutsche Bank AG *** ***
Intesa Sanpaolo SpA *** ***
Societe Generale --
Royal Bank of Scotland PLC/The *** **
UBS AG *** -
UniCredit SpA ** **
Non-Financial Firms
Gaz de France ** **
France Telecom **
Deutsche Telecom AG -* *
Bayer AG *** ***
Iberdrola SA --
Carrefour SA ** **
Daimler Chrysler *** ***
Fortum Oyj *** ***
Koninklijke Aeronautic Defense ** *
Deutsche Post Fin ** *
European Aeronautic Defense -* *
Lafarge SA *** ***
Akzo Nobel NV --
Lufthansa AG *-
Henkel AG -*
Note: Column 2 shows the results of the ADF test that the residuals
from the equation CDSt = αi +βiCSt + t have a unit root. Column
3 shows the results of the Philipp-Perron Unit Root Test. ***, ** and
* indicate that the 0 hypothesis of non-stationarity can be rejected
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.30
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Table 5
Serial Correlation Tests Residuals
CDS Credit Spreads
Financials Chi2 P-value Chi2 P-value
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA 2.402 0.121 1.491 0.221
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA 1.11 0.292 1.185 0.276
Banco Santander SA 0.12 0.728 2.531 0.111
Barclays Bank PLC 1.61 0.21 0.603 0.437
BNP Paribas 0.28 0.59 4.91 0.000
Commerzbank AG 1.12 0.29 1.011 0.314
Credit Agricole SA 0.07 0.79 5.93 0.015
Credit Suisse Group AG 0.14 0.707 0.73 0.393
Deutsche Bank AG 2.2 0.138 1.72 0.192
Intesa Sanpaolo SpA 0.151 0.283 7.79 0.005
Societe Generale 1.67 0.195 0.91 0.342
Royal Bank of Scotland PLC/The 1.88 0.170 0.48 0.489
UBS AG 1.45 0.229 0.95 0.330
UniCredit SpA 2.06 0.152 11.26 0.001
Non-Financials
Gaz de France 0.25 0.617 0.18 0.669
France Telecom 1.74 0.187 0.37 0.54
Deutsche Telecom AG 0.06 0.811 0.59 0.441
Bayer AG 1.22 0.269 0.59 0.439
Iberdrola SA 0.25 0.615 1.01 0.315
Carrefour SA 0.47 0.492 0.45 0.499
Daimler Chrysler 10.69 0.001 8.43 0.004
Fortum Oyj 0.18 0.676 3.62 0.057
Philips 0.42 0.516 8.48 0.004
Deutsche Post 0.11 0.735 12.98 0.000
European Aeronautic Defense 0.18 0.669 0.12 0.996
Lafarge SA 0.13 0.716 1.19 0.275
Akzo Nobel NV 1.34 0.245 12.521 0.000
Lufthansa AG 12.52 0.000 12.301 0.001
Henkel AG 1.2 0.272 0.01 0.907
Note: We tested for serial correlation of the residuals for each unit in the sample. We ﬁrst
estimated the speciﬁcation in columns (4) and (8) in Table 5 for each unit. We used the
Breusch-Godrey LM test for serial correlation on the residuals of those regressions. The
maximum number of lags of the dependent variable required by the serial correlation tests
in order to avoid serial correlation is the same number of lags of the dependent variable used
to estimate the panel regressions in columns (3), (4), (7) and (8) in Table 1.31
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Table 6
Comparison between the one-step and two-step Cointegration Tests
FIN NON FIN
One step approach CDS CS CDS CS
Error Correction Coeﬃcient -0.015 0.025 -0.01 0.03
t statistic -1.18 3.56 -1.15 3.5
Engle-Granger Test
Error Correction Coeﬃcient -0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.04
t statistic -1.29 4.07 -1.34 3.91
Table 7
Extended Speciﬁcation up to end-July 2007
FIN NON FIN FIN NON FIN
Expl/Dep Var CDS CDS CS CS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Delta Implied Volatility 0.56 0.005 0.47 0.02
(0.002) (0.827) (0.024) (0.527)
Stock Return -0.16 -0.05 0.08 -0.04
(0.004) (0.049) (0.748) (0.174)
Delta 10year Treasury -2.66 -2.68 -4.07 -2.89
(0.001) (0.004) (0.414) (0.027)
Market Return -0.02 -0.32 -0.1 -0.13
(0.441) (0.000) (0.670) (0.152)
D e l t aV o l aM a r k e t 0.32 0.001 0.2 -0.2
(0.000) (0.987) (0.549) (0.029)
EC -0.07 -0.03 0.35 0.06
(0.003) (0.002) (0.030) (0.000)
R2 5 8 %4 % 4 %4 %
No of observations 1677 2368 1645 2340
Note: Fixed eﬀects panel estimation using only the sample up to August 2007. The
ﬁrst 2 columns show the estimation results for the CDS spreads, ﬁnancial and the
non ﬁnancial sample, while the last 2 columns show the results for the credit spreads
estimations.32
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Figure 4
Change in Explanatory Power over Time
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Note: R2 from 1 year moving window rolling regressions (ﬁxed eﬀects panel estimations) of CDS spreads
and credit spreads on common factors and speciﬁc factors respectively. Firm-speciﬁc factors are: individual
ﬁrms’ weekly changes in implied volatility and weekly stock returns. Common factors are: weekly changes
in ten-year government bonds, weekly changes in EURO STOXX 50 implied volatility and weekly returns on
the Datastream Euro Area Stock Price Index.33
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